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MUSINGS (0% AI-Written)

NOV 10 26

J. Reindollar

CLOUDLAND

Real estate should be a compelling asset class: compounding cash flow, inflation hedge, tax-efficient, irreplaceable real assets.

 

But the annualized return for private real estate funds and public REITs have underperformed other alternative asset classes. 

 

Cambridge Associates research (annualized returns):

 

Category                                                                3-Yr     5-Yr    10-Yr    20-Yr

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Private Real Estate                                           -1.29%    3.81%    6.00%    5.63%

Public REITs (NAREIT mPME)                       6.84%    4.51%    5.93%    7.88%

Public Equities (Russell 3000 mPME)    17.96%   11.43%   13.95%   10.60%

US Private Equity                                              7.35%    9.15%   15.08%   12.88%

US Venture Capital                                         11.03%    7.43%   15.99%   13.00%

Ex-US Developed PE/VC                               8.00%    8.46%   14.66%   11.85%

 

How is this possible? 

 

In theory, real estate should be viewed as a “bond +” investment.  Recurring cash flows + inflation adjustments + capital / vacancy risk.  Again, going back to Discount Rate = Risk Free Rate + Spread.  We should see a premium return on a long time horizon vs. bonds.  But how about against private equity generally?  If we bought a company that sells widgets.  And demand for widgets exceeds supply.  We can manufacture more widgets.  Cash flow is uncapped. 

 

Real estate cash flow, on the other hand, is relatively less elastic.  We can’t simply add another hotel room if occupancy is 100%.  But downside is protected: we will forever need rental apartments in New York City.  Widgets may become obsolete. 

 

So in theory real estate SHOULD underperform in strong markets and outperform in weak ones.  But we aren’t seeing that outperformance in the data.  Why?

 

Because fund managers and sponsors forced a private equity fee load onto real estate, in hopes it can perform closer to general private equity.  In search of 20%+ IRRs, fund managers charge 2% asset management fees, property management fees, carried interest, acquisition fees, construction management fees, all while significantly over-levering the real estate and navigating complex misalignments with sponsors' real estate Operating Companies.  With the rationale that real estate experts can find the best deals and the fees are warranted. 

 

We tried to financially engineer real estate into a private equity risk / return profile.  Imagine if we did this to the bond market.  Sponsors would then be misaligned to raise AUM, chase yield (at the cost of value), and bet aggressively on interest rate declines.  Is that not what we are seeing in real estate? 

 

And this system on real estate kind of worked until…

 

Capital flooded the system; and

Valuations peaked; and

Interest rates rose

 

So… is the real estate private equity model dead?  Is there another way to invest in real estate to highlight the category’s strengths?

NOV 03 26

J. Reindollar

CLOUDLAND

RE Fundamental Investing

Cap Rate = Risk Free Rate (RFR) + Spread (S)

NOI / Initial Basis = RFR + S

S = “Risk” (how risky, or sticky, is the income relative to RFR)

S also = Supply / Demand of Investment Capital for an Asset Class

 

Essentially, S = the Riskiness of cash flow, as determined by Supply and Demand of investment capital for a particular investment class.

 

Our job: Where is S incorrectly priced?  Where is the supply of investment capital not appropriately pricing the stickiness of income?  Capital markets are wrong all the time.  Example: Amazon’s impact on retail has been severe.  Amazon resistant essential retail (small suite strip centers in dense residential nodes) experienced rising cap rates, along with high street retail, from 2019-2023ish as capital fled retail real estate categories generally. 

OCT 05 26

J. Reindollar

CLOUDLAND

Before the 1990s, real estate was mostly owned by families, developers, insurance companies, and pension funds. 

 

Closed-end, blind-pool private equity funds debuted in early 1990s.  The model benefitted from:

 

  1. High cap rates (purchasing fragmented real estate, typically owned by families without other liquidity options)
  2. Decreasing interest rates
  3. Institutional value-add initiatives
  4. Later, portfolio level synergies (internal infrastructure, property level costs)

 

Now we are in a rising rate environment with peak valuations (low cap rates), private equity firms are scrambling to justify acquisitions with #3 and #4. 

 

While those levers still work in certain asset classes, we increasingly believe that certain categories, like hotels, do not benefit from private equity.

 

Why?

  1. Often, local family-run operators are more efficient than centralized, for profit hotel managers
    1. They are also better motivated than a helicopter AM team with mercenary GM
  2. Private equity teams “design by committee” – same high-design renovations are everywhere, without buy-in from the local community.  “Design by committee is a camel.”
  3. I would argue that culture / sense of place are the most important determinants of profitability of a hotel.  Locals, with the correct programming and buy-in, create culture.  Not desktop warriors in New York. 

 

Is it so wrong that hospitality investing / operations should not include a “rollup”? 

SEP 22 26

J. Reindollar

CLOUDLAND

Downside for buying small properties unlevered: lower IRR

Sometimes, lower MOIC

 

 

Upside: Protect basis during macro downturns

Maximize whole $ profits ("you can't eat IRR")

Significantly less risk of "losing your equity"

Lowers transactional friction (lending process the same for $2m and $40m deals)

Time-horizon and business plan optionality

Most surprising benefit: can offer compelling seller financing at exit to enhance pricing

 

 

Current investment market conditions favor real estate debt vs. real estate equity

 

 

We like real estate equity, unlevered or low-leverage

SEP 15 26

J. Reindollar

CLOUDLAND

In real estate investing, there's a fundamental tension between DURATION and LIQUIDITY.

 

Benefits of long DURATION in a real estate fund: frictionless compounding of interest, ability to harness Operating Company Value, the power of scale, knowledge of your own assets, data / information. We've materialized this first-hand in our employee housing, neighborhood retail, and vacation rental platforms.

 

I feel very strongly that real estate investing performs best over long time-horizons.

 

BUT, it is at the expense of LIQUIDITY to LP investors, who have their money tied up for the long-term with one sponsor / investor.

 

Paramount to getting comfortable with DURATION: TRUST. Can you TRUST your manager. Who are they as a person. And TRUST is impossible to build in one meeting or one dinner.

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